Supra-National Judicial Decisions and National Courts by Mosler, Hermann
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 4
Number 3 Spring 1981 Article 1
1-1-1981
Supra-National Judicial Decisions and National
Courts
Hermann Mosler
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation





Judge of the International Court of Justice, The Hague; Emeritus
Professor of Law, University of Heidelberg.
I. THE IMPACT OF THE SUPRA-
NATIONAL JUDICATURE ON THE
NATIONAL JUDICIARY
What is the importance of international judicial decisions for
an international society which is progressing towards a community
governed by the rule of law? There is no need to say that uniform
laws and their application by a judiciary whose highest court in the
hierarchy guarantees their enforcement, afford one of the principal
means of converting a society composed of different territories,
groups and traditions into a legal community. The historical devel-
opment of the judiciary in federal States is, mutatis mutandis, ap-
plicable also to international society. The effective role played by
the Court of Justice of the European Communities is a striking
example.'
A. The Problem of Dualism
The importance of the judiciary is an indicator of a society
which has reached a high degree of integration. The present inter-
national community is halfway between the anarchy of individual
and independent sovereign States and organized cooperation. This
situation to a large extent prevents an effective comparison of in-
ternational courts with the national judiciary which applies an
elaborate system of norms and acts on the authority of a State to
which the parties to the proceedings are subject. International
1. The Court is without doubt the most important regional institution existing today
because it exercises jurisdiction in many fields of economic law and economic administration
which formerly belonged to the national jurisdiction of the member states. Because of the
direct effect of its judgments and the preliminary rulings, the relationship between the na-
tional and the community judiciary is unique; it differs from any other type of relationship
between international and national courts. See note 8 and accompanying text, infra.
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courts derive their jurisdiction from treaties between States. Their
authority is based on the treaty, limited by its terms and by reser-
vations made by the participating States. Despite the fact that the
organizational element is a significant feature of modern interna-
tional society, and the fact that the United Nations' membership is
quasi-universal, every State-whether old or new-takes part in
international relations as a separate, indivisible legal entity. As a
consequence, rights and obligations derived from international law
are still imputed to the State as a subject of international law, its
internal sphere of jurisdiction being separated from the interna-
tional legal order.
National courts are organs of the State acting on the basis of
the written or unwritten Constitution of the country. In most
countries they are independent of the executive branch of the gov-
ernment. Judgments of international courts are, in principle, bind-
ing on States as subjects of international law. Nonetheless, they do
not create authority and obligations for national courts or other
organs of the State acting within its internal legal order.
This is a restatement of the old concept of dualism between
international law and international organs on the one hand, and
national law and national organs on the other. It was on the basis
of the exclusive sovereignty of each State, in conformity with the
practice of the nineteenth century, that the first thorough discus-
sions on the effects of international judicial decisions took place at
the Second Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907.1 There was no
doubt that, within the limits of their competence, the organs of the
State should ensure that the State comply with an international
judgment binding on that State.
It was left to internal law to prevent or eradicate discrepancies
between the acts of national organs, including courts, and the du-
ties resulting from international law, including international judg-
ments. A particular problem in this respect is the effect of the in-
terpretation of a treaty by national courts in subsequent cases in
2. Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536 [hereinafter cited as Second Hague Convention]. See Ac-
TES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA DEUXItME CONFARENCE DE LA PAIX 420 (1907); H. WEHBERG, KOM-
MENTAR ZU DEM HAAGER ABKOMMEN BETREFFEND DIE FRIEDLICHE ERLEDIGUNG INTERNATION-
ALER STREITKEITEN VOM 18. OKTOBER 1907, 150-55 (1911); Huber, Die Fortbildung des
V6lkerrechts durch die IL internationale Friedenskonferenz im Haag 1907, 2 JAHRBUCH
DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART 470, 557-67 (1908); Limburg, L'autoritg de chose
jug~e et decisions des juridictions internationales, 30 RECUEIL DES COURS [RDC] 518, 582-
84, 1929 V (1931).
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which provisions of the same treaty were relevant.
The two Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 mark the climax
of the movement in the late nineteenth century .directed to pro-
moting judicial settlement by arbitral tribunals set up by the liti-
gant States.3 The two standing courts of potentially universal juris-
diction created after World Wars I and II, the Permanent Court of
International Justice4 and the International Court of Justice,5 were
not able to modify the dualist relationship between international
and national jurisdiction. Some progress, however, was made to-
wards a closer link between the two types of jurisdiction.'
As a result of the process of decolonization, the number of sov-
ereign States has increased to about 160, thereby more than doub-
ling the size of the international community since World War II.
These new members of the community seem to have decided to
establish their nation within its existing frontiers, with the existing
population, and with the firm intention of taking part as a sover-
eign entity in international relations and in international organiza-
tions. As a consequence, the old separation of the international and
national legal orders is, in theory, maintained in the same manner
as it had been in the traditional, more limited international society
before 1945. In fact, however, the general interdependence of
States, the necessity for mutual cooperation, as well as the network
of international organizations of a political, economic and technical
character have diminished the sphere of independent action. Thus,
the internal order of sovereign states is exposed to many interfer-
ences from supra-national decisions, the impact of which depends
to a certain extent on the relationship between international and
national Courts.
The principal institution for judicial settlement of disputes be-
tween States is the International Court of Justice. In the past two
decades, this institution did not play the role it should have as the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations and as the only judi-
cial institution to which all the States in the world may have ac-
cess. The reasons for the deplorable abstention by potential liti-
3. Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1799, T.S. No. 392 [hereinafter cited as First Hague Convention]; Second
Hague Convention, supra note 2.
4. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 14; PUBLICATIONS OF THE P.C.I.J., ACTS AND Docu-
MENTS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT, ser. D.
5. PUBLICATIONS OF THE I.C.J., ACTS AND DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF
THE COURT, no. 3, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Statute and Rules of the Court (1978).
6. The question will be examined in section IV, infra.
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gants of submitting their disputes to the I.C.J. have often been
examined; therefore, there is no need to repeat them here.7 At pre-
sent, a slight upward tendency can be noted. In contrast, the inter-
pretation of general international law and, to a lesser degree, of
treaties in force, by the Permanent Court and by the present I.C.J.
exercises a great influence on the decisions of national courts (as is
shown by many decisions of such courts).
B. Universal, Regional, and Specialized Courts
Apart from these institutions of general jurisdiction, regional
and specialized international courts have gained importance. In the
author's view, it would be no exaggeration to state that the current
trend is more favorable to the use of these kinds of judicial institu-
tions than to submission to the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. The rea-
sons for this trend are complex. They are justified in part by politi-
cal considerations, by technical specialties of the subject matter, or
by the common legal background of a region which guarantees a
more effective activity of bodies rendering binding decisions.
These new types of courts are often more closely connected
with the internal legal order of the participating States. Yet, such
courts are certainly not free from the classic problems resulting
from the dualism between the obligation of States in the interna-
tional sphere and their execution in the national legal order. Nev-
ertheless, the separation is mitigated by provisions of treaties, na-
tional legislation, and judicial practice.
The main examples of currently functioning modern interna-
tional courts of both a regional and a specialized character are the
Court of the European Communities at Luxembourg and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg. The former exercises
jurisdiction conferred by treaties establishing the so-called "inter-
grated" Communities for Coal and Steel, Economy, and Atomic
Energy,' the latter by the European Convention on Human
7. See, e.g., JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DisPuTEs (an international sympo-
sium held at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law,
1974); THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (L. Gross ed. 1976); Mosler,
The International Court of Justice at its Present Stage of Development, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J.
545 (1979).
8. Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, arts. 31-
45, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25,
1957, arts. 164-88, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity, March 25, 1957, arts. 136-60, 298 U.N.T.S. 161; Convention Relating to Certain
Institutions Common to the European Communities, March 25, 1957, arts. 3-4, 298 U.N.T.S.
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Rights.9 Decisions by their Courts furnish most of the recent cases
involving questions of the influence of supra-national courts on na-
tional law and national courts, because they deal in most cases
with individual applications and only exceptionally with inter-
State disputes, i.e., between the contracting parties themselves.
C. Individuals as Parties Before International Courts
Judicial settlement in the traditional sense is limited to States
as parties. Individuals (natural persons and corporate bodies) as
well as international groups and organizations lack ius standi in
iudicio (the right to appear as a party) before traditional tribunals.
The appearance of parties other than States is a new phenomenon
first established by the Peace Treaties after the First World War.
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals were set up to decide disputes relating to
the economic clauses of the treaties and the interested persons
themselves appeared as parties. 10 These tribunals and other insti-
tutions of a similar kind established after World War II,11 are not
typical examples of the international judiciary in the traditional
sense because they are designed to settle disputes when at least
one party is a private person or corporation, and which have arisen
from problems stemming from a war between the contracting
States. Additionally, the tribunals' existence is either limited to a
certain time or ends with the accomplishment of their task.
In contrast, the Court of European Communities at Luxem-
bourg and the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg
were established within the framework of international organiza-
tions and were given permanent functions on the basis of their
constitutive treaties which themselves are intended to have a per-
manent character. Before the Court of the European Communities,
individuals may confront the Commission of the Communities,
267. Jurisdiction was extended in 1972 to Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland by their accession to the Communities.
9. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, arts. 19, 38-56, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, and four additional Protocols, [hereinafter cited as
European Human Rights Convention]. All cases must be brought first before the European
Commission on Human Rights. Id. art. 47. If they are not declared admissible, no examina-
tion of the merits takes place. Id. arts. 25-27.
10. Strupp, The Competence of the Mixed Arbitral Courts of the Treaty of Versailles,
17 Am. J. INT'L L. 661-90 (1923); Wiihler, Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 142-46 (1981).
11. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Conciliation Commissions Pursuant to Art. 83 of the Peace
Treaty with Italy of 1947, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-54 (1981).
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which is the executive organ of the organization. 12 Although an in-
dividual who has brought his case before the Commission on
Human Rights is not entitled to appear as a party,"5 the case
before the Court concerns the individual's human right which has
been allegedly violated by the defendant State. In these cases, the
Court is called upon, if necessary, to afford just satisfaction for the
injury suffered.
14
Other organizations, economic and political, have followed
these examples, mutatis mutandis. The most recent examples are
found in the treaty of the Andean Group creating the Court of Jus-
tice of the Cartagena Agreement 15 and in the Constitution of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San Jos6 de Costa Rica
which started its activities in 1979.16
This new element, the participation of entities other than
States as parties in international judicial proceedings, increases the
importance of the problem we are examining, namely, the attitude
to be adopted by national courts regarding judgments of interna-
tional courts. Disputes brought before a court of this kind are
much more closely related to internal law than are the classic in-
ter-State disputes, although disputes concerning internal matters
of the State litigant can of course also be decided by submission to
a legal procedure on the inter-State level.
17
D. Actual Importance of the Problems Relating to the Rela-
tionship of National and Supra-National Courts
At the beginning of this study the question was raised whether
the problem of taking position with regard to judgments of inter-
national courts is of real relevance for national courts. Now the
answer can be given: generally speaking, both the number of such
cases before national courts, and the legal difficulties involved
12. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 8, art. 73.
13. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 9, art. 27. Only the Commission
and/or a contracting State may bring a case before the Court. Id. arts. 43-48.
14. Id. art. 50.
15. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, May 28, 1978, 18
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS [I.L.M.] 1203. For the text of the Cartagena Agreement, see Agree-
ment on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910. For the preparatory
work of the proposed Andean tribunal, see F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE ANDEAN LEGAL ORDER
104-07 (1978).
16. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673.
17. See, e.g., Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of In-
fants [1958] I.C.J. 55; Various Serbian Loans [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 20; Brazilian Fed-
eral Loans [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A. Nos. 20, 21.
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therein, are increasing; this proposition is, however, not valid to
the same degree for the national courts of all countries.
Many States have not submitted themselves to any interna-
tional jurisdiction: for the courts of these countries, international
judgments rendered between other States as parties can only have
persuasive weight for the national court's own arguments in a mat-
ter relating to international law. The situation is quite different for
those States which take a friendly attitude towards international
judicature and who are parties to treaties providing for the submis-
sion of the various types of cases mentioned above for judicial set-
tlement. In broad terms, international judicial settlement, with its
consequential problems for national courts, is important in homo-
geneous geographic regions, in economic organizations and inte-
grated economic communities, in organizations with limited pur-
poses of a technical or similar nature, and in the field of human
rights.
As regards the J.C.J., the trend seems to be away from the use
of the optional clause,"' and rather to favor treaties containing
clauses on judicial settlement by the court or a special ad hoc
agreement 9 between the parties.
The possible importance of international legal decisions in na-
tional courts is increased by the fact that not only the courts of the
State parties concerned, but also those of States belonging to the
same multilateral treaty system whose interpretation is involved,
may be affected, the latter by intervention in the proceedings or in
an indirect way. This is the problem of the indirect effect of inter-
national judgments on third States. When the decision in question
is one by the I.C.J. stating or enunciating general principles or
rules of law, all national courts of the world may take it into ac-
count in one way or another as evidence of the development of
international law.
To summarize, our problem has numerous aspects, differing
according to the circumstances. The vast majority of the cases
before national courts available for scrutiny come from tribunals in
Western Europe, the United States, and the Commonwealth coun-
tries, including India, which derive their legal system from English
tradition. Some cases come from Japan, Latin America, and Iran.
18. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, para. 2.
19. Id. art. 40, para. 1. See, e.g., Special Agreement for the Submission of the Question
of the Continental Shelf to the International Court of Justice, June 10, 1977, Libya-Tunisia,
18 I.L.M. 49.
No. 31
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This result of the author's research does not necessarily mean that
other countries are not confronted with this problem; the possibil-
ity cannot be excluded that there exist collections of judgments
which did not come to this author's knowledge or that court deci-
sions exist, but are not published.
Nonetheless, the problem appears to be increasing in impor-
tance to the same degree as increasing economic and technical re-
lations bring about a need for judicial settlement.
Finally, two further observations are in order. First, a great
many States have been hesitant to submit their disputes to the
I.C.J. which, as mentioned above, is the only existing international
court of general jurisdiction. 0 This situation may change especially
if States make use of the possibility afforded by the Statute and
the Rules of Court to form chambers for dealing with a particular
case.
2 1
Secondly, States tend to settle their differences by nonjudicial
means or through a friendly settlement in the course of a judicial
procedure. For example, from 1972 to 1978, the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes [connected with the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] set up
Arbitral Tribunals in nine cases involving private companies with a
State member of the Center. Six awards have been rendered so far;
several cases have been discontinued because of a settlement be-
tween the parties.2
National courts may be faced with decisions of supra-national
judicial bodies in various circumstances. In different situations
which may occur in national judicial proceedings the question at
issue for the national court may be either the: (1) application of an
international judgment as such to the actual case pending before
it; (2) application thereof in similar cases; (3) application of a legal
20. At present (Oct. 1981) three cases are pending before the Court: (1) Tunisia/Libya
(Continental Shelf), (2) Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the U.N. Adminis-
trative Tribunal, and (3) Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in
the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America, Order of Jan. 20, 1982).
21. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 26, para. 2; Rules of the Court,
art. 17. See Mosler, supra note 7, at 556-61. For the first time, a Chamber of five judges
(including the elected judge of U.S. nationality and a Canadian Judge ad hoc) has been
constituted to deal with the Gulf of Maine dispute, supra note 20. (Ed. note: The author is a
member of this Chamber.)
22. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, March 18, 1965, 575
U.N.T.S. 159; INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ELEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 1976/77 at 32, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT 1977/78 at 5, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT 1978/79 at 5.
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rule or a legal dictum enunciated in an international judgment; (4)
the use of such a rule or dictum as an authoritative argument for
its own reasoning; (5) mention of the international judgment in its
own reasoning in giving it legal weight equal to other evidence or
other relevant sources of reference (e.g., legal writings, documents,
and State practice in international relations).
This is a brief and simplified statement of the main possibili-
ties open to national courts when they must define their attitude
toward supra-national judicial decisions. Each possible approach
may be adopted on the basis of different legal backgrounds and for
different reasons.
National courts of a State bound by an international judicial
decision may implement an international judgment or act for the
following reasons: (1) in order to execute it within its national legal
order; (2) in order to take account of the international legal obliga-
tion imposed by the international judgment on the government of
the State of the court in question; (3) because the same parties are
parties to the national and to the international proceedings; (4) be-
cause the national and the international cases are legally identical
or analogous and the government of the State of the national court
was a party to the international judicial proceedings; or (5) because
the national court arrives at the same conclusion as the interna-
tional judgment.
Similarly, national courts of States not parties to a case sub-
mitted to international judicial proceedings may apply legal princi-
ples, rules, or considerations set out in the motivation of the deci-
sion in this case for the following reasons: (1) because of the
binding authority, in the particular circumstances, of the interna-
tional judgment; (2) because of its persuasive authority; or (3) be-
cause it supports the national court's own considerations in the ac-
tual case.
Finally, a number of different reasons may lead the national
court to include in the motivation of its own decisions references to
international judgments; such inclusion may range from using
them as an authoritative source of law to inducing a simple quota-
tion from them among other quotations.
Examples of these approaches will be furnished in the course
of the following pages.
II. SUPRA-NATIONAL JUDICATURE
The category of supra-national judicature is not confined to
S433No. 3]
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permanent international courts which have been defined by the
Permanent Court of International Justice as "[bodies] already con-
stituted and as having [their] own rules or organizations and pro-
cedure. ' '23 There are also other international judicial institutions
which may possess the characteristic features of a court. While this
study emphasizes permanent courts, it is indispensable to consider
other institutions whose decisions raise the same questions with re-
gard to their effects on national courts.
Arbitration, for example, leads to binding settlement of a dis-
pute on the basis of the law, arrived at by judges appointed by or
with the consent of the parties. The judges decide the case inde-
pendently, i.e., free of any instructions from the parties. Arbitral
tribunals include both bodies constituted ad hoc in case of a par-
ticular dispute and bodies established on the basis of a general ar-
bitration treaty or of a compromissory clause providing for proce-
dural mechanisms for the setting up of the tribunal when a dispute
occurs. Insofar as they offer the same guarantee of independence
and impartiality of the judges, and insofar as they observe the
same degree the generally recognized rules of judicial proceedings,
and apply the principles and rules of international law, their judg-
ment has the same legal value as that of courts whose bench is
constituted in advance for all cases which may arise during the
term of office of the judges, and which proceed on rules enacted
once for all in advance.24 Leaving aside the elements of permanent
organization and a permanent code of procedure (which, strictly
speaking, are found only in international courts in the full sense),
the following general criteria are common to judicial and arbitral
settlement:2 (1) independence from the government and the par-
ties; (2) equality of the parties in the proceedings; (3) objective
rules to guide the judge in determining the law; (4) rules of proce-
dure appropriate for the subject matter of the dispute and for a
fair conduct of the proceedings; and (5) binding effect of the judi-
cial decision.
Final decisions of such institutions are supra-national within
the meaning of that term for the purposes of this study. The term
23. Advisory Opinion [1925] P.C.I.J., ser. B., No. 12, at 30.
24. Simons, Das Verhdltnis der nationalen Gerichtsbarkeit zur internationalen
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Gerichtsbarkeit, 9 MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT
FOR VOLKERRECHT 72 (1929).
25. See Mosler, Problems and Tasks of International Judicial and Arbitral Settlement
of Disputes Fifty Years After the Founding of the World Court, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL DIsPUTEs, supra note 7, at 9.
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"supra-national," as it is used in international relations today is
imprecise due to having both a wider and a more restricted mean-
ing. The more restricted meaning is used in the so-called "inte-
grated" Economic Communities of regional groups of States.
Supra-nationalism in this sense, as first defined in the negotiations
preparing the establishment of the European Communities, 26 has
two essential features, the first of which is the power of one or
more organs of the community to act, in accordance with the con-
stituent treaty, directly within the domestic jurisdiction of all
member States without interference by national governments or
authorities and with direct legal effect; the second is the indepen-
dence of the executive organ from the member States. In the Euro-
pean Communities "supra-nationality" is attributed to legislation
in the form of regulations and directives, and to executive acts in
the form of decisions, and to certain acts of compulsory execu-
tion.2 1 In the broader sense, supra-nationality means the power of
an international organ set up by a treaty between States, to take
decisions in full independence from the States parties to the
treaty, with binding effect on the States concerned. The supra-na-
tional element of an international organization is strengthened if a
judgment by its judicial organ has direct effect within the internal
legal order of the State, either by virtue of the treaty or because
the national Constitution provides for direct application of deci-
sions of the supra-national judicature.
A. Permanent Supra-National Courts
The following institutions can be considered as permanent
supra-national Courts. Although the list does not purport to be
complete, it may provide an indication of the States and groups of
States involved in a system of judicial settlement and the subject
matter presently attributed to specialized international courts.
General jurisdiction open to all States and extending to legal
disputes of any kind was exercised between the two wars by the
Permanent Court of International Justice and has been exercised
since 1947 by the present I.C.J.2s The jurisprudence of the two
26. Mosler, Die Entstehung des Modells supranationaler Staatenverbindungen in den
Verhandlungen Uber den Schuman-Plan, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR W. HALLSTEIN, 355-86 (1966).
27. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 8,
arts. 189, 192, at 78-79; H. MOSLER, THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A LEGAL COMMUNITY
187-88 (1980).
28. See supra notes 4 & 5, art. 36, para. 2.
No. 31
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courts is regarded as a continuous whole. In effect, the decisions
and advisory opinions of the Permanent Court are quoted by the
I.C.J. as authoritative, but not binding, dicta on international
law.
29
Regional and/or specialized courts of the past or those pres-
ently in existence are the following: (1) the Central American
Court of Justice,30 the first example of a permanent international
court; (2) the European Court of Human Rights;31 (3) the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights;32 (4) the Court of Justice of the
European Communities; 3 (5) the East African Common Market
Tribunal;34 (6) the Arbitral College of the Benelux Economic
Union;33 and (7) the Court of Justice of the Andean Agreement. 8
A convention in connection with the Western European Union,
provides for a tribunal for the protection of private interests
against the Agency for the Control of Armaments.37 Furthermore,
in the framework of the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) and in connection with the European
Agency for Atomic Energy, a tribunal was established with the au-
thority to decide appeals against decisions of the Agency.38
Additionally, tribunals composed of judges selected from pre-
established lists and constituted ad hoc are provided for in the
Fisheries Convention of March 9, 1964 (between 10 European
29. See, e.g., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1978] I.C.J. 3, at 18, 24, 29, 33.
30. Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, Dec. 20,
1907, 206 Parry's T.S. 79 (expired on March 11, 1918).
31. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 9. The Court has delivered 45
judgments between 1960 and February 1981, while several cases are still pending before it.
32. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 16, at 690. The Court was con-
stituted in 1979 and has not yet been seised by an application or by a request for an advi-
sory opinion.
33. See supra note 8.
34. Treaty for East African Co-operation, June 9, 1967, Kenya-Tanzania-Uganda, 6
I.L.M. 932.
35. Treaty Instituting the Benelux Economic Union, Feb. 3, 1958, Belgium-Luxem-
bourg-Netherlands, arts. 41-53. 381 U.N.T.S. 165, 186-93.
36. Treaty creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15.
The treaty will enter into force after all subscribing member countries have deposited their
respective instruments of ratification. Id. art. 37.
37. Convention Concerning Measures to be Taken by Member States of the Western
European Union in Order to Enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to Carry Out
Its Control Effectively and Making Provision for a Due Process of Law in Accordance with
Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty as Modified by the Protocols Signed at Paris on Oct.
23, 1954, [1961] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] II 386.
38. Convention on the Establishment of a Security Control in the Field of Nuclear En-
ergy, Dec. 20, 1957, art. 12, [1959] BGBI 586, 598.
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States)39 and in the "INTELSAT"-Convention of August 20,
1971.40 Also, the constitution of arbitral tribunals is provided for in
the framework of the International Center for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes.41
B. "Semi-Permanent" Tribunals
A good deal of the practice of international judicature in rela-
tionship to national law and national courts appears in what one
can call "semi-permanent" tribunals arising from the framework of
peace settlements and treaties after World War II establishing nor-
mal relations between the former belligerent countries. Mixed Ar-
bitral Tribunals and Mixed Claims Commissions have been formed
under the peace treaties following World War I between each of
the Allied and Associated Powers on the one side, and Germany
and her Allied Powers on the other.42 Mixed Claims Commissions
have existed between the United States and some European States
on one side, and certain Latin American States on the other.43 Af-
ter World War II "conciliation commissions" were created between
the victorious and defeated States under the Paris Peace Treaties
of February 19, 1947, but were in fact arbitral tribunals whose de-
cisions were to be accepted by the Parties "as definitive and bind-
ing. '44 Moreover, a number of arbitral tribunals and commissions
have been created in order to settle questions concerning the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany arising out of the Second World War.45
39. Annex II, 581 U.N.T.S. 57, 68-75.
40. Annex C, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3880-89, T.I.A.S. No. 7532.
41. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 22.
42. These tribunals have not been established between all potential parties; the total
number of tribunals is 36. See C.F. OPHOLs, GEMIscHTE SCHIEDSGERICHTE; 3 K. STRUPP &
H.J. SCHLOCHAUER, WORTERBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS, 173 (1962); RECUE1L DES DPCISIONS DES
TRIBUNAUX AR1ITRAUX MIXTES (i partir de 1922); A. DE LA PRADELLE, JURISPRUDENCE DES
TRIBUNAUX ARBITRAUX MIXTES (1927); D. SCHINDLER, DIE SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT SEIT 1914,
30 (1938).
43. Their awards are found in the collection INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, pub-
lished by the United Nations.
44. Peace Treaty with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, part IX, art. 83, para. 6, 61 Stat. 1245, 1411,
T.I.A.S. No. 1648.
45. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and Oc-
cupation, May 26, 1952, 332 U.N.T.S. 219, amended by Protocol on the Termination of the
Occupation Regime, Schedule IV, Oct. 23, 1954, 331 U.N.T.S. 253 (established the Arbitral
Commission on Property, Rights, and Interests in Germany, and the Supreme Restitution
Court); Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 333 U.N.T.S. 3; Treaty on
Property Rights, Austria-Federal Republic of Germany, June 15, 1957, 58 W.G.B.B. 129.
(For an evaluation of the work of this tribunal and the text of its Binding Opinion, see J.
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Although these institutions produced a rich jurisprudence, the
circumstances under which they were created and the situations
which they had to settle are of such a peculiar character that it is
generally not possible to draw parallels between them and tribu-
nals instituted for normal international relations. 6 The effect of
their decisions with regard to the national legal order and national
courts is usually defined in a more precise form than is commonly
done in other treaties providing for judicial settlement.47 Conflict-
ing international and national decisions are therefore rare, occur-
ring only in exceptional cases.4 s
III. CLASSIFICATION OF SUPRA-NATIONAL
JUDGMENTS ACCORDING TO THEIR
OPERATIVE CLAUSE ["DISPOSITIF"].
International judgments, like national judicial decisions, may
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, THE AUSTRIAN-GERMAN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL (1972). The most recent
example of this kind is the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Declaration of the Govern-
ment of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of
Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 223, 230.
46. von Mangoldt, Arbitration and Conciliation, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL DISPUTES, supra note 7, at 417, 463-64.
47. The "Binding Opinions" of the Austrian-German Arbitral Tribunal are binding for
the courts and all other competent authorities. Property Rights Treaty, supra note 45, art.
108, para. 2. According to the Treaty of Versailles, "The High Contracting Parties agree to
regard the decisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal as final and conclusive, and to render
them binding upon their nationals." Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 304(g), 225
Parry's T.S. 189, 343. In conformity with this provision, the German Reichsgericht (Su-
preme Court) decided that the examination by domestic courts of the grounds given by the
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal for its judgment is inconsistent with art. 304(g) of the Versailles
Treaty and with art. 3 of the Reichsgesetz of 10 August 1920, concerning the execution of
the provisions of the Treaty in regard to Arbitral Tribunals. Judgment of May 25, 1928, 121
Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 180. See Agreement on German External Debts, supra
note 45, art. 31 (binding effect of the Mixed Commission for the questions regarding Annex
IV of the Agreement on German External Debts).
48. In Judgment of Jan. 5, 1965, Corte d'appello, Genoa, [1966] Rivista di Diritto Inter-
nazionale 395, the Court of Appeal of Genoa refused to follow the interpretation of art. 78 of
the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 given by the Conciliation Commission established by the
same treaty whose decisions were to be "accepted by the parties as definitive and binding."
Peace Treaty with Italy, supra note 44, art. 83, para. 6, 61 Stat. 1245, 1411, T.I.A.S. No.
1648. The court considered the decision of the Commission as confined to the individual
case. The rule of interpretation would have been binding in the internal Italian order in
other cases of the same kind only on the basis of a legislative measure. Pavia v. Amministra-
zione di Finanze, Jan. 5, 1965. These cases are discussed by Schreuer, The Authority of




be classified and analyzed according to the purposes of their opera-
tive clause. Proceedings before any court, national or international,
may be directed to obtaining a decision which creates a new legal
situation (e.g., the adjudication of a title to jurisdiction), or one
which gives an order to perform an act (e.g., to pay compensation),
or one which states, in a declaratory form, how the law disputed
between the parties is to be applied and interpreted; or the deci-
sion may be to dismiss the action, when study of the reasons per-
mits one to learn what kind of claim was involved in the case.
The effect of judgments with regard to the parties and their
national courts and, possibly, with regard to third States and their
national courts is largely dependent on the nature of international
judgment involved.49
A. Assignment of Territorial and Personal Jurisdiction
Decisions may determine title to territory. For example, the
I.C.J. found in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case:
[T]hat the sovereignty over the islands and rocks of the Ecrehos
and Minquiers groups, in so far as these islands and rocks are
capable of appropriation, belongs to the United Kingdom.50
A judgment in similar terms was rendered by the I.C.J. in the Case
Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land.5 1
The question of right of passage over foreign territory was dis-
puted by Portugal and India before the I.C.J.5 2 Furthermore, juris-
dictional rights of the parties in international waterways have sev-
eral times been decided by the Court.53 Questions of territorial
status also relate to the international validity of the delimitation of
fisheries zones and the base lines of the territorial waters. For ex-
ample, in a case concerning illegal fishing by a British subject, the
Norwegian Supreme Court mentioned the recognition of the
fisheries limits by the judgment of the I.C.J. in the Norwegian
Fisheries case" as an argument that the municipal courts of Nor-
49. C.W. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 711-13 (1964); Verzijl,
Inter-State Disputes and Their Settlement, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
TrvE, Part VIII, 592-93 (1976).
50. [1953] I.C.J. 47, 72.
51. [1959] I.C.J. 209, 230. Cf. Temple of Preah Vihear (Merits) [1962] I.C.J. 6, 36. For
other examples see C.W. JENKS, supra note 49, at 711.
52. Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory, [1960] I.C.J. 6, 43, 46.
53. C.W. JENKS, supra note 49, at 711 n.12 (with references).
54. [1951] I.C.J. 116, 143.
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way should operate to ensure complete respect for this limit."
Judgments which relate to the continental shelf belong to the
same group of decisions involving territorial jurisdiction .5 Territo-
rial title is disputed although the delimitation of the boundaries
may not be fixed in detail in the operative clause of a judgment.
For example, in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the I.C.J.
defined the principles and rules of international law applicable to
delimitation as between the parties of the continental shelf areas
in the North Sea. 57 A case of a similar nature involving Tunisia
and Libya is currently pending before the Court. 8
With regard to jurisdiction over persons in foreign territory
the I.C.J. case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United
States of America in Morocco offers an example of a decision on
the extent of consular protection.2
International judgments may also recognize the right to fly the
flag of a specific State and the nationality of persons and
companies.8e
Operative clauses in ,this category delimit the respective juris-
dictional titles of the parties. Normally, the dispute exists only be-
tween the parties, one of whom possesses the title which the Court
will assign as appropriate. In these cases, however, the judgment
has effect erga omnes: it has to be respected by all other States
and their organs, including the national courts. The above men-
tioned decision of the Supreme Court of Norway is not here a good
example because Norway was herself a party to the proceedings
before the I.C.J.1 There is, however, no doubt that other States
are bound to recognize the respective limits of jurisdiction between
the litigants, unless third States have themselves a claim to the
55. Rex v. Cooper, 20 I.L.R. 166 (Supreme Court, Norway, 1953). In another case, the
accused, who had appealed on the ground that the Norwegian fisheries line was contrary to
international law, abandoned this contention after the International Court of Justice had
rendered the Fisheries Case decision. Rex v. Martin, 20 I.L.R. 167 (Supreme Court, Norway,
1953).
56. See Arbitration on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (United Kingdom v.
France) 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979).
57. [1969] I.C.J. 3, 53.
58. [1978-79] I.C.J.Y.B. 124. On April 14, 1981, the Court denied Malta's application to
intervene in this case. Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment on
Application to Intervene, [1981] I.C.J. 3, 20.
59. [1952] I.C.J. 176, 212.
60. Verzijl, supra note 49, at 592.
61. Similarly, the French Cour de cassation, in a judgment of Oct. 20, 1959, did not
question that the Minquiers and Ecrehos Islands were under British sovereignty according
to the 1953 decision of the I.C.J. 39 I.L.R. 425-26.
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subject of the litigation. If, for example, only two of four coastal
States adjacent to the same continental shelf are parties to a judg-
ment delimiting the submarine zones as between them, the other
two are not concerned with the effect of the judgment.
B. Judgments for Calling for the Performance of a Specific
Act by the Parties
A judgment may order the payment of a certain sum by one
party to another.2 Several judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights have condemned the defendant State, after having
stated that the State had violated the Convention, to pay a certain
sum of money to the applicant ("the injured party" in the terms of
the convention) as a "just satisfaction."
6 3
The act of performance ordered by a judgment may of course
consist of acts other than payment.
Judgments of this type state that because an obligation exists,
the State concerned must comply with the order of the decision.
Their legal effect is the same as that of any other international
obligation resulting from any source of international law. 6 The
dispositif is binding only on the party or parties which are ordered
to act.
C. Declaratory Judgments
Declaratory judgments have been defined by several judg-
ments and advisory opinions of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice as decisions "the intention of which is to ensure rec-
ognition of a situation at law, once and for all and with binding
force as between the Parties, so that the legal position thus estab-
lished cannot again be called in question in so far as the legal ef-
fects ensuring therefrom are concerned." 65 The Court made clear
62. See, e.g., The S.S. Wimbledon, [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 1; Corfu Channel Case,
[1949] I.C.J. 244, 259; 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1432 (1971).
63. See, e.g., Ringeisen Case, [1972] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 678 (Eur. Ct. of
Human Rights, ser. A., No. 14); Neumeister Case, [1974] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
536 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, ser. A., No. 15); Engel Case, [1976] Y.B. Eul. CoNy. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 500 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, ser. A., No. 22). Five other such cases had
been decided as of February, 1981.
64. Ruiloba-Santana, Eficacia de las sentencias internacionales en el orden interno de
los estados, 1973 JURIDICA 627, 643-44.
65. Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 Concerning the Case of the Factory at
Chorz6w, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 11. See also Case Concerning Certain German Interests
in Polish Upper Silesia, [1926] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 7; Polish Postal Service in Danzig, [1925]
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that it was not prevented by its Statute from giving judgments in a
declaratory form; however, its decision has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case. 6 The
purpose of this provision was, in the view of the Court, simply to
prevent legal principles accepted by the Court in a particular case
from being binding upon other States or in other disputes.
Other international courts follow the example of the Perma-
nent Court. Declaratory judgments are a normal form of final and
binding judicial decisions. The declaration of the legal situation or
of a legal rule existing between the parties can have various objec-
tives. It may consist either in an interpretation of a treaty provi-
sion binding on the parties or in a statement that certain acts of a
national organ, including the legislature or judiciary, are inconsis-
tent with the obligations under the treaty or under general inter-
national law. For example, the condemnation of a defendant State
by the European Court of Human Rights is expressed in the opera-
tive clause by a statement that the State violated one or more pro-
visions of the Convention. The facts which constitute the violation
are not mentioned in the operative clause, but are stated in the
reasons for the judgment. On the other hand, consequences of the
decision to be deduced from the decision by the government and
by its organs are not pointed out either in the operative clause or
in the reasoning.
Declaratory judgments of international judicial bodies are
much more problematic for national courts than are other kinds of
judgments. In its early years, the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice made a clear distinction between the operative part
of a declaratory judgment and the reasons:
The Court is unable to see any ground for extending the binding
force attaching to the declaratory judgment on the point decided
to reasons which were only intended to explain the declaration
contained on the operative portion of this judgment .... 11
It pointed out, however, in the same advisory opinion that "all
parts of a judgment concerning the points in dispute explain and
complete each other and are to be taken into account in order to
determine the precise meaning and scope of the operative por-
P.C.I.J., ser. B., No. 11.
66. Statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice, art. 59.
67. Polish Postal Service in Danzig, [1925] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 11, at 30.
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tion." s Thus, this issue may arise before national courts. Even
though the sole addressees of the judgment are States, domestic
courts will probably take into account the statement of law con-
tained in an international judgment. The limits of the res judicata
effect of declaratory decisions are less strict than those of the effect
of judgments concerning performance of acts and adjucating juris-
dictional titles.
The government which has been a party to the international
proceedings is bound to derive the appropriate conclusions from
the declaratory statement in terms of its own internal legal order.
An important case illustrative of this effect occurred in 1979 before
the European Court of Human Rights. 9 On the application of an
illegitimate child and her mother of Belgian nationality, the Court
found that Belgian legislation applying to the rights of illegitimate
children and to the family relations between mother and child vio-
lated the right of family life guaranteed by the European Conven-
tion. The violations stemmed not from individual measures against
the applicants, but directly from the contested Belgian
provisions.10.
This judgment has a declaratory character. The legal status of
the child and the mother and their relations in law with each other
are not changed directly by the effect of the statement. According
to the Court, "the judgment is essentially declaratory and leaves to
the State the choice of the means to be utilized in its domestic
system for performance of its obligations under Article 53. .. ."
(e.g., the undertaking of the Parties to abide by the decision of the
Court).1
The Belgian State has the duty to give the two applicants a
legal position in conformity with the ratio decidendi of judgment.
This result can only be achieved by a legislative change within the
country itself. The Belgian State is therefore under an obligation
deduced from the operative part of the judgment as explained by
the ratio decidendi to bring legislation on the matter into line with
the requirements of the Convention. Even if it were possible to
"wipe out all the consequences of the violations of the Convention
68. Id. at 29.
69. Marckx Case, [1979] Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HumAN RIGHTS 410 (Eur. Ct. of Human
Rights, Judgment of June 13, 1979, ser. A., No. 31, para. 58).
70. Id.
71. Id. On the obligation of states to abide by the Court's decisions see European
Human Rights Convention, supra note 9, art. 53.
No. 31
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
in the case of the two applicants and to reestablish the situation
which would have existed if the individual violation had not oc-
curred", it follows from the judgment that Belgium must amend
her general legislation with regard to the family relations of illegiti-
mate children. 2 By participation in the Convention, Belgium has
undertaken to secure to everyone within her jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms defined therein.
All member States of the European Convention are bound by
the Convention to guarantee in their internal legal order the exer-
cise of the same rights and freedoms including those defined in the
judgments."3 In contrast, their legal obligation to abide by a deci-
sion of the Court is restricted to any case to which they are par-
ties.74 A member State's own legislation may contradict one of the
rights guaranteed by the Convention as interpreted by the Court in
a case concerning another contracting party. Although they are
certainly not bound directly, the declaratory judgment rendered
against another party to the Convention may in practice cause leg-
islative reforms to be considered and enacted elsewhere. In coun-
tries where international treaties are applied as part of national
law, the same question which in other countries is to be considered
by the government and the legislature comes up before national
courts in cases in which the application of the Convention as na-
tional law is involved.
If the operative clause of a declaratory judgment does not
clearly define the rule applied by the court, the reasoning has even
greater weight. The reasoning must necessarily be consulted if the
operative clause does not lay down a rule in explicit terms and only
states that there is an inconsistency between the duty of the State
under treaty law or general international law on the one hand, and
its actual behavior on the other.
Definitions of legal rules pronounced in declaratory judgments
or explained in the ratio decidendi of any judgment are relevant
not only to the national courts of States parties to the dispute, but
also to national courts of other States. Therefore, the relevance of
judgments declaratory of general international law is not limited to
national Courts of member States of a treaty system like the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, but extends also to national
72. Jayme, Europidsche Menschenrechtskonuention und deutsches Nichtehe-
lichenrecht, [1979] NaEu JURISTISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2426.
73. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 9, art. 1.
74. Id. art. 53.
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courts of other States generally.m
D. Dismissal of Action
If an application to the court is rejected by a final judgment,
the operative clause consists only of the declaration of dismissal. It
orders or declares nothing, its wording is purely negative, and its
meaning can only be deduced from the reasoning. The State which
has lost its case is, of course, bound to drop its claim against the
other party. The effect of dismissal on its national courts depends
upon the legal status accorded to international law and interna-
tional judgments in the national legal order. Everyone, including
national Courts, may take the legal reasoning of the case as an au-
thoritative argument, but are not bound to follow it. For example,
the Court of Appeal of Brussels rejected an applicant's argument
based on the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal legislation
as embodied in the European Convention of Human Rights 6 be-
cause the European Commission on Human Rights had in another
case declared this article inapplicable to fiscal matters.7"
E. Preliminary Rulings
In order to guarantee the uniform application of a law-making
treaty, and in order to strengthen the supra-national character of
international judicial decisions, it has often been suggested that
when a question of international law is essential to the decision of
a case pending before the national courts, these courts should sus-
pend their proceedings until an international court has issued a
preliminary ruling on the matter. At present, the most widely
known and significant realization of this procedure in a treaty pro-
vision is article 177 of the treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community.7" According to this provision, the Court of Jus-
tice of the Communities is empowered to issue a preliminary
decision concerning (1) the interpretation of the treaty; (2) the va-
lidity; (3) the interpretation of the acts of the institutions of the
Community; and (4) the interpretation of the statutes of any bod-
75. See, e.g., the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Court in the Nottebohm Case,
[1955] I.C.J. 4, and in the Barcelona Traction Case [1970] I.C.J. 3.
76. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 9, art. 7.
77. Judgment of Nov. 12, 1976, [1977] Y.B. Eut CONY. ON HuMAN RIGHTS 270 (Cour
d'appel, Bruxelles).
78. Supra note 8.
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ies set up by an act of the Council of the Communities, where such
statutes so provide. Referral of such legal questions is mandatory
for municipal courts of last resort; it is optional for lower courts.
The national court hearing the case is bound by the ruling given by
the I.C.J., but may nonetheless submit further questions to the
Court for further enlightenment.80
This provision is one of the most marked indications of the
supra-national character of the European Communities. However,
the possibility exists that the national courts, particularly the high-
est court, which is obligated to refer the preliminary question of
Community law to the Court of Justice, may follow the French
doctrine of acte clair, arguing that the rule of Community law is
unequivocal and does not require a preliminary ruling. 1
According to the German Federal Constitutional Court, the
preliminary ruling of the Court of the Communities is binding on
all German courts which have to deal, at the different levels of ju-
risdiction, with the same case. This ruling applies to the Federal
Constitutional Court itself when it is examining constitutional as-
pects of the case.82 Furthermore, the Constitutional Court held
that it is not competent to interpret or apply provisions of the
EEC Treaty in contradiction to a preliminary ruling of the Court
of Justice at Luxembourg. 3 When evaluating this absolute superi-
ority of the Luxembourg Court, one must not forget that the Euro-
pean Communities have created an autonomous legal order. The
relationship between the organs of the Community and the organs
of member States does not correspond to the normal relationship
between international institutions and internal organs of States. As
a rule, the confrontation between the international legal order and
the organ acting on behalf of it on the one hand, and the national
,legal order and the State governmental entity on the other, does
not exist in the European Communities. The circumstances calling
79. Identical provisions exist in the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, supra note 8, art. 150. Slightly different ones are found in the Treaty Institut-
ing the European Coal and Steel Community, supra note 8, art. 41.
80. Case 29/68, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. (pt. 35) 390 (1969); Marquis, Legal Integration in
the Common Market, 1979 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 207, 211.
81. Marquis, supra note 80, at 212. For the practice of the French Cour de cassation,
see Weiss, Self-Executing Treaties and Directly Applicable EEC Law in French Courts,
1979 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 51, 79-82.
82. Order of the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court, June 8, 1977, 45
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 142.




for a preliminary ruling arise when a national court cannot decide
a case according to national law unless a preliminary question of
Community law has been answered. Thus, the interrelations be-
tween Community law and the remaining part of national jurisdic-
tion are so closely connected that a case may have aspects of both.
Despite this peculiarity of the law of the European Communi-
ties, the submission of questions to international courts for prelim-
inary ruling may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to other organiza-
tions and treaties. For example, there is a movement, particularly
in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in favor
of conferring on the Human Rights Court competence to issue rul-
ings on the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention
when an application is received either from member States or their
national courts. An alternative solution following this rationale but
having lesser effect, is the advisory jurisdiction of the recently cre-
ated Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 4
National courts may be permitted, either by treaty law or by
national legislation, to suspend proceedings in a pending case until
an essential preliminary decision regarding international law has
been given. 5 The preliminary ruling differs from all other forms of
international judicial decisions inasmuch as the rule defined by the
judgment is directly binding on the national court concerned.
The extension of this procedure in order to create a uniform
application of treaty law or of general international law raises diffi-
cult questions. In the author's opinion, trends in this direction
should be encouraged, but realization of this procedure can be
expected 'only when relatively small and homogeneous groups of
States are involved.
IV. THE EFFECT OF SUPRA-NATIONAL
JUDGMENTS ON THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY
OF THE STATES CONCERNED
As long as no international constitution exists to which the
States are subordinated, the dualism between international and
national law, international organizations and national organs, will
84. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 16, art. 64.
85. A French-Italian Conciliation Commission deduced the necessity to discontinue
proceedings in a municipal court because of the supremacy of the Commission over munici-
pal courts. The case is reported in C. H. SCHREUER, DIE BEHANDLUNG INTERNATIONALER OR-
GANAKTE DURCH sTAATLIcHE GERICHTE 316 (1969).
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not disappear. Although the separation of the two legal orders is
no longer as strict as it was before the First, and to a certain extent
before the Second World War, there is no doubt that there exists
no hierarchical relationship between international institutions and
the internal order of the member States. The international legal
order and the domestic jurisdiction of States are not, however, in-
dependent from one another, but must be considered as compo-
nents of a general system of law. Even during the period of history
when the dualist doctrine was at its apogee, no one denied the obli-
gation of States to behave in conformity with general international
law and their treaty commitments.8 6 As early as the 1907 negotia-
tions of the Second Hague Peace Conference, efforts were made to
provide some binding effect of international judgments on the na-
tional judiciary.8 7 Unfortunately, the time was not yet ripe for the
contracting parties to accept such concessions infringing upon their
sovereignty.
Although the theory that States are bound in their capacity as
subjects of international law is still generally accepted, the situa-
tion has changed considerably in favor of the application of inter-
national law, including treaty provisions, in the national sphere of
jurisdiction. Constitutions, legislation, and recognized principles of
internal law are all directed to ensuring, insofar as they have to
deal with matters involving the international responsibility of the
government, the observance of general and contractual interna-
tional general law.88 These efforts to facilitate the application of
international law and enforcing international obligations including
judgments, in what was once the reserved domain cannot entirely
erase the demarcation between the international and national legal
orders. Such efforts may, however, lower the barrier between them,
thereby permitting international law to penetrate the veil of sover-
eignty into the internal sphere of State jurisdiction. This develop-
ment is an appropriate means to circumvent the undesirable conse-
quences of obsolete dualism of classical international law by
technical devices tinged with monism.
The existence of this tendency in national law is an undenia-
86. Triepel, Les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international, 1 RDC 77
(1923).
87. See supra note 2.
88. de Visscher, Les tendances internationales des constitutions modernes, 80 RDC
515 (1952); Mosler, L'application du droit international public par les tribunaux nation-
aux, 91 RDC 619, 625-705 (1957).
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ble fact.8 9 Nevertheless, the development of general international
law along these lines has not reached the point where the State
concerned is legally bound to open its internal sphere of jurisdic-
tion to the binding effect of international judicial decisions and
other international acts.90
Treaties instituting organs for judicial settlement of disputes
usually define in a special article the effects of such judgments.
Normally, the treaties prescribe that the decision of the court is
final, that it has binding force between the parties, and that it im-
poses obligations on them within the context of the particular
case.91 The effect of these and similar provisions is that the govern-
ment concerned is under an international obligation to accept all
the consequences of the judgment. For example, if a title of juris-
diction is recognized or denied, the State is bound to assure that
all national organs exercise their competence within the limits of
this title. If the judgment directs the performance of an act, the
government must perform, either through its executive branch if so
empowered by its legal system or by any other organ which can
contribute to this effect. If the judgment contains declaratory pro-
visions, the State, according to the Marckx judgment mentioned
above, has the choice of the means of bringing about the effect
called for by the judgment.92
When deciding the status of certain territories in the Rann of
Kutch, the Supreme Court of India made it clear that the interna-
tional arbitral award between India and Pakistan was not called in
question:
If we were sitting in appeal on the award of the Tribunal we
might have formed a different opinion of the material, but we are
89. Ruiloba-Santana, supra note 64, at 672.
90. For a general evaluation of the practice regarding the compliance with international
acts see C. H. SCHREUER, supra note 85, at 339-44.
91. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59; European Human Rights
Convention, supra note 9, art. 53.
92. See text accompanying notes 69-71, supra. In Marckx, the Court of Human Rights
stated:
Admittedly, it is inevitable that the Court's decision will have effects extending
beyond the confines of this particular case, especially since the violations found
stem directly from the contested provisions and not from individual measures of
implementation, but the decision cannot of itself annul or repeal these provisions:
the Court's judgment is essentially declaratory and leaves to the State the choice
of the means to be utilised in its domestic legal system for performance of its
obligation under Article 53 [of the Convention].
Judgment of June 13, 1979, ser. A, No. 31, para. 58.
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not. The fact remains that India undertook to be bound by the
award pledging the national honour and we must implement the
award. The only question is as to the steps to be taken."3
Although a State's constitutional provisions may not permit the
implementation of all the consequences flowing from the judgment
the State is still internationally obligated to abide by the decision.
It is generally recognized that acts violating international obliga-
tions of the State engage its international responsibility without
regard to the internal structural organization of the State and
without regard to the separation of powers protecting the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. Article 6 of the Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility prepared by the International Law Commission
speaks, in unequivocal terms, of the irrelevance of the internal or-
ganization of the State. 4 Article 7 adds that responsibility for the
conduct of an organ (of a territorial governmental entity) within a
State shall also be considered as an act of that State under inter-
national law.95
In an individual case, the subject matter of the international
decision might fall outside the competence of the executive branch
of government. For example, compensation in money may be ac-
corded by the government, an administrative measure may be or-
dered by it, or the conduct to be observed in international rela-
tions as prescribed by a judgment may be adopted by the
government as representative of the State in external affairs. It
may, however, happen that the subject matter of the judgment re-
lates to acts which, according to national law, cannot be executed
by either the government or by authorities subordinated to it. The
national courts belong to this latter category of organs.
The international judgment has no direct effect on such or-
gans. On this point the traditional dualistic analysis of the situa-
tion is still valid as general international law regardless of the type
of operative clause in the international judgment96 and regardless
of what principles, rules, and evaluations of law are defined or in-
dicated in the reasoning of a judgment.97
93. Patel v. Union of India, 1978 Commonw. Int'l L. Cases 232, 267.
94. [1971] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1) 243-53.
95. [1976] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 2) 73.
96. See Section III, supra.
97. See, e.g., Verzijl, supra note 49, at 594; Ruiloba-Santana, supra note 64, at 642, 644;
1 S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 129 (1965);
Golsong, L'effet direct des normes de la Convention europtenne des Droits de l'Homme et
des dkcisions prises par les organes institugs par celle-ci, in LEs RECOURS DES INVIDIDUS
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For instance, the Court of Appeal of the International Tribu-
nal of Tangier, has taken the position that a judgment of the I.C.J.
is binding only upon the High Contracting Parties which must
then take the necessary internal legislative measures to carry out
the decisions of that High Court. For these reasons, the judgment
cannot have an obligatory character on individuals who might liti-
gate similar measures. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal recognized
that such decisions "might at best provide inspiration and gui-
dance, although not because [they] have any binding force in mu-
nicipal courts."98
International courts are not appellate courts or courts of last
resort with power of review over national courts. This is true even
where international jurisdictions are competent to examine na-
tional legislation, administrative acts, and judgments of national
tribunals. Because the European Convention on Human Rights99
guarantees the free exercise of certain individual rights within
member countries, the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court (and
the previous jurisdiction of, the European Commission on Human
Rights) must inevitably interfere with the internal legal order. Al-
though its judgments bind only the contracting party concerned, 100
the Court has the duty of qualifying internal measures as being
either in conformity with or in violation of articles of the Conven-
tion. The Court has repeatedly pointed out that it cannot assume
the role of the competent national authorities for it would thereby
lose sight of the subsidiary nature of the international machinery
of collective enforcement established by the Convention. "Review
by the Court concerns only the conformity of these measures with
the requirements of the Convention."
101
In the Sunday Times case, the Court again drew attention to
its earlier dictum that "it is in no way [its] task to take the place
DEVANT LES INSTANCES NATIONALES EN CASE DE VIOLATION DU DROIT EUROP1EN 59-83 (1978).
98. Judgment of August 13, 1954, [1954] I.L.R. 136, 137. The court said rightly that a
judgment of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning rights of United
States nationals in Morocco was limited to the French zone of Morocco and therefore not
applicable to the Tangier zone. The obiter dictum here quoted was not a necessary element
of the motivation.
99. Supra note 9.
100. Id., art. 53. See Drzemczewski, The Authority of the Findings of the Organs of the
European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Courts, in 1 LEGAL ISSUES OF EuRoPEFN
INTEGRATION 6 (1979).
101. Case relating to Certain Aspects of the Law on the Use of Languages in Education
in Belgium (Merits), Judgment of July 23, 1968, ser. A., No. 4, at 35; Handyside Case, Judg-
ment of Dec. 7, 1976, ser. A., No. 24, at 22.
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of the competent national courts but rather to review under Article
10 [freedom of expression] the decisions they delivered in the exer-
cise of their power of appreciation. 1 0 2 Thus, the Strasbourg Court
does not have the power of judicial review which, on the national
level, is normally assigned to a national Court of Cassation. Never-
theless, the influence of its judgments goes beyond giving rise to an
obligation on the State found guilty of a violation of the Conven-
tion to do everything to bring its national order into conformity
with the exigencies of the Convention as interpreted by the Court.
In a number of cases where violation of the Convention was due to
the application of internal legislation, the national parliament en-
acted a new statute or amended an existing one. 103 It has also hap-
pened that without having lost a case a State has nonetheless
changed its law in order to avoid future conflicts with the Court's
interpretation of a protected right by the Convention.1M Further-
more, other member States of the Convention commonly check
their legislation on the basis of standards established by the Court.
If a judgment accords "just satisfaction" to the injured indi-
vidual, the State must give effect to the judgment. Up to the pre-
sent, in every case the sum fixed by the Court has been paid to the
applicant. For this reason, the question whether the claim to the
compensation fixed by the Strasbourg Court can be enforced
before national courts has not yet arisen. It depends on the na-
tional law whether in countries where the Convention forms part
of the internal law, this status is extended to claims the legal basis
of which is derived from a judgment of the Court. In the author's
opinion, it is improbable that any State will go this far even if the
rights guaranteed in the Convention are incorporated into national
law by statutory or constitutional law, or even as international law
having priority over national legislative and constitutional
norms.
1 0 5
The preceding considerations relate to the international aspect
of the binding force of judgments; they give, however, only one side
102. Judgment of April 26, 1969, ser. A., No. 30, para. 59.
103. See, e.g., Schindler, Die innerstaatlichen Wirkungen der Entscheidungen der
europdiischen Menschenrechtsorgane, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR M. GULDENER 273, 281 (1973).
104. In 1965, the Federal Republic of Germany amended the provisions of the code of
criminal procedure regarding preventive detention STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] paras.
112, 121, 122a (W. Ger.). In the Wemhoff Case, which related to the length of preventive
detention (art. 5, para. 3 of the Convention) and went back to the time before the amend-
ment, the Court concluded on no violation (Judgment of June 27, 1968, ser. A, No. 7).
105. Drzemczewski, supra note 100, at 6.
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of the picture. The real effect within the national legal order is
much greater than would appear from the strict rules of interna-
tional law. The general trend of national legal orders and the ef-
forts of courts in all countries to prevent a situation arising
whereby their government would not have complied with interna-
tional obligations, seem to indicate that, even on the basis of inter-
national law, an opinio juris is developing that the municipal or-
gans of States must do everything in their competence to give to
international judgments the full effect to which they are
directed.106
Conversely, a national judgment cannot indirectly render inef-
fective a judgment of an international court. The Permanent Court
of International Justice declared that a Polish tribunal could
neither render nonexistent the violation of an international con-
vention recognized in a former judgment of the Permanent Court,




Contracting parties to a treaty establishing an international
jurisdiction may agree to give a stronger effect to international
judgments and attribute to them a direct effect within their na-
tional domain.
For example, in matters concerning the Revised Rhine Navi-
gation Act105 and the Convention on the Canalization of the Mo-
sel,10 9 the parties who wish to appeal a decision by a national
"Rhine" or "Mosel" navigation tribunal have the choice between a
national Court of Appeal, the Central Commission for the Rhine
Navigation, or the Commission of Appeal of the Mosel
Commission.
Another example of international judgments possessing a cer-
tain internal effect are the awards rendered by a Tribunal of the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Ac-
cording to the Convention establishing the Center, "Each Con-
106. C.W. JENKS, supra note 49, at 715.
107. Chorz6w Factory Case, [1928] P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 17, at 34.
108. Revised Rhine Navigation Act of Oct. 17, 1868 (as later amended) art. 37, 37
L.N.T.S. 210; Convention Amending the Act, Nov. 17, 1963, 35 REVUE DE LA NAVIGATION
INT.tRiEURE r RHfNNE 894 (1963).
109. Convention on the Canalization of the Mosel, Oct. 27, 1957, art. 34, [1956] BGB1
11 1848.
No. 3]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
tracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations im-
posed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judg-
ment of a court in that State."' 10
Courts of economic communities are competent as to some
economic matters formerly reserved to the national domain, but
only in exceptional cases do these courts decide inter-State dis-
putes in the traditional sense, i.e., between member State govern-
ments. In most cases, natural and juridical persons are entitled to
seise such a court of justice. Its primary character is that of a tri-
bunal for administrative matters. Judgments in this field have a
direct effect within all member States. The same is true, as pointed
out above, of rulings given, at the request of national courts, on
preliminary questions of community law in cases pending before
those courts.
The principal example and model for other institutions of a
similar kind is the Luxembourg Court of the European Communi-
ties. The Andean Court, which can also be seised by natural and
juridical persons, is similarly endowed with a jurisdiction effective
within the member-countries: "To be enforceable, the rulings of
the Court shall not require homologation or exequatur in any of
the member-countries.'
B. Res Judicata
The effect of res judicata is limited to parties to the dispute
and to the decision as it is expressed in the operative clause. This
is a general principle of law, and it is repeated in treaty provisions
which define the obligation of the parties resulting from judg-
ments." '2 The jurisprudence of the Permanent Court as well as
that of the present International Court leaves this statement un-
questioned. The Permanent Court, in its Advisory Opinion on The
Polish Postal Service in Danzig, made it clear that the operative
clause determines the scope of res judicata: "the reasons contained
in a decision, at least insofar as they go beyond the scope of the
operative part, have no binding force as between the Parties
concerned."" 3
110. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 22, art. 54.
111. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15,
art. 32.
112. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59.
113. [1925] P.C.I.J., ser B., No. 11, at 29-30. See also Temple of Preah Vihear, [1961]
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The limitation of res judicata to the parties and to the subject
matter which has been the object of the dispute is also taken as
axiomatic by legal writers.114
This emphasis laid on the concept of res judicata between the
interested parties, however, does not mean that international judg-
ments may not have, in particular circumstances, legal effects erga
tertios, or may not at least exercise even without the legally bind-
ing authority, an influence on the conduct of third parties. Men-
tion has already been made of international judgments adjudicat-
ing a territorial or personal title of jurisdiction. In appropriate
cases, the effect of such judgments may be erga tertios and even
erga omnes.1
5
A certain extension of strict res judiciata is indicated in the
Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice
concerning the Polish Postal Service in Danzig. In that case the
Court admitted that all parts of a judgment concerning the points
in dispute are to be taken into account in order to determine the
scope of the operative portion. 1 6 Certainly, the reasons necessary
to motivate the operative clause explain the scope of that clause
and give the party concerned guidance on the action required to
implement it.1 1
7
In fact, reasons stated in international judgments, particularly
those of the I.C.J., are commonly applied not only by the parties to
the dispute. For example, it is quite natural for parties to proceed-
ings before the I.C.J. to support their own case with earlier dicta of
the Court. The same is true in disputes before other international
judicial institutions.
As a rule, the res judicata effect of an international judgment
I.C.J. 17, 27.
114. See, e.g., Limburg, supra note 2, at 523; D. SCHINDLER, supra note 42, at 168; S.
RoSENNE, supra note 97, vol. 1 at 130, vol. 2 at 628; Simons, supra note 24, at 41.
115. 1 S. ROSENNE, supra note 97, at 130-31.
116. [1925] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 11, at 30.
117. In this respect, the Court of Arbitration constituted in the Continental Shelf Case
between France and Great Britain pointed out:
The Court of Arbitration considers it to be well settled that in international pro-
ceedings the authority of res judicata, that is the binding force of the decision,
attaches in principle only to the provisions of its dispositif and not to its reason-
ing. In the opinion of the Court, it is equally clear that, having regard to the close
links that exist between the reasoning of a decision and the provisions of its dis-
positif, recourse may in principle be had to the reasoning in order to elucidate the
meaning and scope of the dispositif (cf. Chorz6w Factory Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A,
No. 13).
Interpretation of the Decision of June 30, 1977, 54 I.L.R. 139, 170 (1979).
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does not extend to proceedings before national courts. This follows
from the general principle that only the State is directly bound,
not its organs. The result may be contrary if the treaty itself pro-
vides for this effect within the national legal order.11
Direct res judicata effect on proceedings of national courts is
impossible in all inter-State judicial settlements because such set-
tlements fail to fulfill the requirements of identity of the parties
and, normally, the subject of the case.11 For instance, the Civil
Court of Brussels rejected the contention of a plaintiff company
who sought to provide international recognition to an executory
judgment for the purpose of obtaining sums which had been at-
tached. The Court reasoned it
cannot maintain that the decision of 15 June 1939 in a dispute
between the Greek State and the Belgian State-taking up its
case before the Hague Court-was a judgment in its favour even
though it was not a party to the case. It is inconceivable that a
party which, by definition, is not admitted to the bar of an inter-
national court, should be able to rely on a judicial decision in a
case to which it was not a party.120
This judgment, however, met with considerable criticism; the ques-
tion was raised why the international judgment had not been rec-
ognized as evidence of the plaintiff's title.1 21 The lack of identity of
the parties (and of the subject-matter) is not an obstacle to the
effect as res judicata before municipal courts if one of the parties
to the international judgment is an individual or a company. There
exists, however, no rule of international law as to the direct effect
in national proceedings, unless such is provided for by treaty.
The European Convention on Human Rights, for example,
does not require that judgments of the Strasbourg Court be
treated as res judicata before the national courts of the State
against which the judgment is given.12 2 The applicant who has
118. The question of res judicata should not be confused with the obligation to execute
an international decision by the competent national authorities. Such provisions are found
in the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, supra note 8, art. 192, and the
Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 32.
119. Schreuer, The Implementation of International Judicial Decisions by Domestic
Courts, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 153, 165 (1975); 1 S. ROSENNE, supra note 97, at 130.
120. Socobel v. Greek State, 18 I.L.R. 3-5 (Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles 1951).
121. 1 S. ROSENNE, supra note 97, at 132.
122. Buergenthal, The Effect of the European Convention on Human Rights on the
Internal Law of Member-States, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 97 (Brit-
ish Institute of International and Comparative Law ed. 1965); Drzemczewski, supra note
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seised the European Commission is not entitled to bring a case
before the Court even though his application which had been ad-
mitted by the Commission is under consideration. Since he is not a
party to the proceedings, the judgment theoretically concerns only
the defendant State. Furthermore, the object of the proceedings is
not the same since the judgment merely declares whether or not
there has been a violation of their right by the defendant State.
The negative result does not necessarily indicate that national
courts are unable to implement judgments of the European Court
and other international courts. Although they are in theory not di-
rectly bound either by the operative part of the judgment or by the
reasons, national courts will take into account the dicta of interna-
tional courts either as persuasive authority, or as a statement of
the international obligations of their own State, which they will
seek to comply with as far as possible.
Following a finding of a violation of the European Convention,
in the additional proceedings to determine just satisfaction to the
applicant the prevailing applicant is provided with a right to com-
pensation. 12 3 Nevertheless, he has even in this part of the proceed-
ings no jus standi in judicio before the Court. Member States are,
however, not debarred from permitting, in their legislation, inter-
nal judicial proceedings in which the judgment on satisfaction is
treated as res judicata. This has been accomplished in a Belgian
case by the Tribunal de Premiere Instance at Brussels which re-
jected the claim of an applicant for compensation on grounds that
the European Court of Human Rights had declared the same claim
not well founded.12
V. RELEVANCE OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
INTERNATIONAL JUDICATURE IN NATIONAL
LAW AND BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS
The competence of national courts to enforce international
judgments, to apply the rules stated or the legal arguments set out
therein, depends on the status of treaties as well as customary in-
ternational law in the national legal order. The position of the na-
tional legal order may be that treaties, insofar as their provisions
100, at 608.
123. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 9, art. 50.
124. Judgment of Jan. 16, 1976, [1976] Y.B. EuR CONY. ON HuMAN RIGHTS 1118.
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are self-executing, and/or the principles and rules of general inter-
national law, form part of the national law or are applied as if they
were national law. Even if this is the route chosen by a State in its
constitution or by its unwritten internal law, it does not necessarily
follow that national courts are authorized to apply international
judgments or to treat their reasoning as binding on them. Whether
this is done depends on closer examination of the legal order of
each State.
The application of treaty provisions is normally prescribed in
explicit terms, while that of general international law may often be
left to judicial practice. In many countries the prevailing trend is
towards liberalized application of international law; the differences
are therefore not as great as one might suppose in view of the dif-
ferent constitutions, laws, and traditions of the various states.
National law usually makes a distinction between treaty law
and customary international law. In most countries of continental
Europe, in the United States, and in other countries following the
same traditions, such treaty provisions are self-executing, i.e., need
no further implementation by the national legislature and there-
fore are applied as national law. Constitutions differ in the position
attributed to such treaty law in the hierarchy of the national sys-
tem of norms. As a rule, treaty provisions having a self-executing
character are applied on the same level as national statutory law
enacted by the parliament. They are regarded as being on equal
footing with original statutes of the legislature, i.e., the later act
prevails over the previous one.
A. Countries Incorporating Treaty Provisions
Under this system, the legislature can overrule the treaty by
enacting a statute in contradiction to the treaty's provisions
thereby engaging the international responsibility of the govern-
ment. In countries where either treaty provisions in general or par-
ticular treaties have the same authority as constitutional law (as,
for example, in Austria, the European Convention on Human
Rights) the earlier treaty supersedes even later statutes enacted by
parliament. The question may arise whether treaty provisions hav-
ing constitutional character prevail over other conflicting provi-
sions of the constitution.
A similar issue, although on a somewhat different legal basis,
gave rise to a famous decision of the Federal Constitutional Court
of the Federal Republic of Germany. At the request of a German
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administrative tribunal, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities gave a preliminary ruling stating that the individual right
to freedom of commerce and profession-as defined by the EEC
Treaty-was not, in the particular case, violated by application of
a norm of Community law. The administrative tribunal expressed
doubt whether the effect of this ruling might not amount to a de-
nial of the right to the free exercise of a profession guaranteed by
[article 12 of] the Basic Law, i.e.. the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Germany. The tribunal submitted to the Federal Con-
stitutional Court the question of compatibility of the ruling with
the Basic Law: Finding there was no conflict in the particular
case, 125 the Court expressed regret that the Communities lacked a
specific bill of rights and a democratically legitimated parliament
possessing legislative powers directly elected by general suffrage.
The Court further intimated that as long as these conditions were
not fulfilled, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Grund-
gesetz must prevail.1 28 The problem in this case, and in parallel
cases before other high jurisdictions1 2 7 (as, for example, the Italian
Constitutional Court) is not one of a conflict between two norms of
constitutional character because the European Communities form
an autonomous legal order in themselves. The interpretation of
Community law by the Luxemburg Court is binding on every organ
and every person subjected to this legal order. Community law,
therefore, as a matter of principle, has priority over national law
and over the decisions of national courts. However, as regards the
application of Community law within the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the latter must not, according to the Federal Constitutional
Court, prevail in case of conflict with fundamental rights of the
Constitution. From this aspect, the conflict of norms has been
analogized by the constitutional courts in Germany and Italy to a
conflict between rules derived from different sources where one
rule must be given priority in a concrete case.
12 8
125. Decision of May 29, 1974, 37 BVerfGE 271; 14 Common Market L.R. 540. The case
is reported and discussed at length by Marquis, supra note 80, at 223-29.
126. [1949] BGB1 I, arts. 1-19.
127. For the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court, see Marquis, supra note
80, at 221-23.
128. The importance of the German decision should not, however, be overemphasized.
The Federal Constitutional Court recognizes that the Luxembourg Court adopts the rules
embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights, although it is not formally bound
by them. In a recent decision, the Court of the Communities emphasized that it takes ac-
count of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutional traditions of the member
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Conflicts of this kind cannot arise in countries in which self-
executing provisions of international agreements prevail over the
constitution itself and must be applied by the courts with priority
over all domestic legislation.129
National constitutions and laws are normally silent on the
functions of national courts with regard to international judg-
ments. Nonetheless there are exceptions. For example, the Nether-
lands Constitution provides that the rule giving priority to self-
executing provisions of international agreements applies similarly
to "decisions made by organizations based on international law."
The conclusion drawn from this is that self-executing decisions of
international courts may be given the same precedence over the
Netherlands Constitution and legislation as are the self-executing
provisions of treaties themselves. So far, no conflict has arisen be-
tween the Dutch legislation and the European Convention.3 "
The status accorded treaty provisions as law applicable in the
internal legal order does not necessarily dictate the enforceability
of international judgments before national courts. Illustrative ex-
amples are rare, probably because national codes of judicial proce-
dure do not envisage this situation. sl This position is borne out by
the fact that a judgment of a national court which has been found,
on the international level, to be a violation of State's obligation is
not thereby invalidated; rather, it can only be deprived of its inter-
nal effect if national legislation provides procedural means to reo-
pen the case.13 2 If, however, an international tribunal renders a
binding decision which does not relate to a previous national judg-
ment, it is quite probable that national courts will contribute, as
far as possible, to the execution of the international judgment.
states, Case 44/79, Hauer v. Rheinland-Pfalz, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. Rep. No. 10, para. 15, at
3729, 3744.
129. CONSTITUTION OF THE NETHERLANDS, art. 66.
130. Id. art 67; Evans, The Practice of European Countries Where Direct Effect Is
Given to the European Convention on Human Rights in Internal Law, in COUNCIL OF EU-
ROPE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLLOQUY ABOUT THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(Athens, Sept. 21-22, 1978) 109, 162-63, 166 (1979).
131. Id. at 154-56. See also the Order of the German Federal Administrative Court, on
the application of Dr. E. K6nig, that decisions on cases tried by the European Court of
Human Rights cannot quash judgments of national courts. (Order of Sept. 10, 1979, not
published).
132. Austria has established, by a Federal Act of March 26, 1963, the right of a con-
demned person to apply for a retrial of his case, if his recourse to the European Commission




In principle, the national judge, who is generally obliged by
constitution or statute to implement international law, may take
account of an international judgment if he is not barred from so
doing by an explicit national provision to the contrary.
If an international court is competent to interpret a treaty to
which the State is a party, then the State is obligated to apply the
treaty as interpreted by the international court. Consequently, na-
tional courts must decide cases in conformity with the rule so in-
terpreted even if they expressed another viewpoint in previous
cases. For example, the European Court of Human Rights has de-
cided that the Convention includes the right to have the free assis-
tance of an interpreter if the defendant cannot understand or
speak the language used in court and that he may not be ordered
to reimburse the expenses so incurred even if he loses his case. In
response to this Convention, German courts have changed their
case law which has conceded the free assistance of an interpreter
only to defendants who were acquitted.133
It is not free from doubt that this view of the competence of
national courts to enforce international judgments is generally rec-
ognized in practice."" The reason for the author's conclusion is the
following: This section of the present study refers to states which
have opened their national legal order to the application of inter-
national law. The extent of that application depends on two condi-
tions. First, it depends on the bearing of the obligation imposed on
the State by the treaty; the treaty provisions are to be interpreted
according to the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which are applied, as the I.C.J. and the European Court
of Human Rights have repeatedly declared, as customary interna-
tional law.1 5 Secondly, only self-executing provisions are directly
applicable. Yet, the concept of "self-executing" is not limited to
such matters of substantive law as civil rights or criminal offenses.
It includes any provision which can be applied without further im-
plementation by any national organ whether executive, administra-
tive or judicial.
133. Art. 6, para. 3e; Luedicke Case, Judgment of Nov. 28, 1978, Eur. Ct. of Human
Rights, ser. A, No. 29. In response to this interpretation, German courts whose case law had
not been uniform generally apply the Court's doctrine. See, e.g., 1979 N.J.W. 2484.
134. See Evrigenis, Reflection on the National Dimension of the European Convention
on Human Rights, in COLLOQUY ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 130, at 78.
135. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, arts. 31-33, 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969).
No. 3]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
B. Countries Not Incorporating Treaty Provisions
In countries where self-executing provisions of treaties do not
operate in the internal legal order, the position of municipal
courts, as explained previously, differs from national courts in
countries which incorporate treaty provisions.
The most important country of the group which does not ad-
mit the internal application of treaty obligations in the absence of
legislative incorporation is England. Consulting Halsbury's Laws of
England, one finds:
International agreements may be referred to if they are embodied
in the statute or have in effect been incorporated in the statute,
in accordance with powers conferred by it, by means of
subordinate legislation; but where a statute is unambiguous refer-
ence cannot be made to a draft convention scheduled to it in or-
der to give a section a meaning other than its natural meaning.136
Based on the supposition that "there be some municipal legis-
lation giving enforceability to the right," the Supreme Court of In-
dia recognized that rights stated by an international court (refer-
ence was made to the Permanent Court of International Justice)
can be claimed in a municipal court.137
In recent years, the question has arisen several times before
English courts whether, and if so to what extent, rights embodied
in the European Convention on Human Rights (to which Great
Britain is a party) could be applied or taken into account. In R. v.
Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, ex parte Salamet
Bibi, Lord Denning said:
[W]hen Parliament is enacting a statute or the Secretary of State
is framing rules, the courts will assume that they have regard to
the provisions of the convention and intended to make the enact-
ment accord with the convention, and will interpret them accord-
ingly. But I would dispute altogether that the convention is part
of our law. Treaties and declarations do not become part of our
law until they are made law by Parliament."138
136. 36 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, 623, at 411 (3d ed. 1961).
137. Rao v. Union of India, 5 Commonw. Int'l L. Cases 1, 27 (1976).
138. [1976] 3 All E.R. 843, 847, C.A.. See 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L., 348-52 (1976-77). See
also Cheney v. Conn. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 242, 9 Brit. Int'l L. Cases 795-99 (Supp. 1966-70,
1973) where reference is made to 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 40 (8th ed. 1955):
Such treaties as affect private rights and, generally, as require for their enforce-
ment by English courts a modification of common law or of a statute, must receive
parliamentary assent through an enabling Act of Parliament. To that extent bind-
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To what extent a judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights would have an influence on an English court was dealt with
as recently as 1979 by the Chancery Division of the High Court in
Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2)."1a
During a previous criminal trial, prosecuting counsel stated that
the telephone of his client had been tapped by police on the au-
thority of a warrant issued by the Secretary of State. The client,
plaintiff in the case, issued a writ against the police claiming, inter
alia, that any tapping of telephone lines violated the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. Plaintiff con-
tended that Article 8 of the Convention conferred on him a direct
right to have his "private and family life, his home and his corre-
spondence" respected. Alternatively, if the convention did not con-
fer a direct right, it was at least a guide to the interpretation and
application of English law.140 In 1978, the European Court of
Human Rights, in the Klass case, considered whether a German
statute which permitted, under certain conditions, governmental
surveillance of post and telecommunications without requiring the
authorities to notify those concerned, was in conformity with Arti-
cle 8 of the Convention. The European Court was satisfied with the
German measures of control which were designed to prevent
abuses.141 In the Malone case, the judge dismissed the claim stat-
ing that the Convention "does not, as a matter of English law, con-
fer any direct rights on the plaintiff that he can enforce in the En-
glish courts.1 42 The judge found himself unable to construe the
English law as based on the Convention and on the interpretation
given by the Strasbourg Court in the Klass case. It appeared to the
judge:
[t]hat where Parliament has abstained from legislating on a point
that is plainly suitable for legislation, it is indeed difficult for the
court to lay down new rules of common law or equity that will
carry out the Crown's treaty obligations, or to discover for the
first time that such rules have always existed. 1 43
ing treaties which are part of international law do not form part of the law of the
land unless expressly made so by the legislature.
Compare R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Phansopkar, [1976]
Q.B. 606.
139. [1979] 1 Ch. 344.
140. Id. at 351. See European Human Rights Convention, supra note 9, art. 8.
141. Case of Klass, [1978] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 622.
142. Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1979] 1 Ch. at 378.
143. Id. at 379.
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The only remedy is to interpret English law as being, as far as pos-
sible, in harmony with treaty obligations entered into by the
Crown.
The well-known rule regarding general international law that
"international law is part of the law of the land" allows the courts
to apply such principles and rules to the point until legislation ex-
plicitly prevents them from doing so. In this respect, the legal situ-
ation is no different from the position of the courts in countries
which allow self-executing treaties.
According to universal practice, municipal courts construe na-
tional law in such a way that its application will not engage the
responsibility of their government in international relations. All
English decisions, quoted above attempt to follow this principle.
For this reason, conflicts between national and international judg-
ments are rare.
If legislation seems to contradict a prior treaty, national courts
may, in order to avoid international difficulties for the government,
construe the relationship between the treaty and the subsequent
statute as a relationship between lex specialis and generalis. For
example, the former German Reichsgericht (Supreme Court of the
German Reich) preserved some rights conceded to Russian nation-
als in a treaty of 1894, although a later statute of a general charac-
ter applying to all persons under German jurisdiction, did not per-
mit such rights. The court reasoned that a later lex generalis could
not abrogate the earlier treaty (applicable as German law) which
was directed solely to the status of a certain group of persons, i.e.,
Russian nationals in Germany.
1 44
VI. THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUDGMENTS ON NATIONAL COURTS OF NON-
PARTY STATES
The binding effect of international judgments does not extend
beyond the parties to the dispute. Thus, absent special circum-
stances, third-party States and, a fortiori, their municipal courts
are in principle not concerned with such judgment. Special situa-
tions in which a direct or indirect influence is exercised may, how-
ever, arise in the following special situations: (1) intervention by
third States in the proceedings; (2) implementation of a judgment
interpreting a multilateral convention by municipal courts of
144. 111 RGZ 40 (1929).
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States who are parties to the dispute; or (3) reference to principles,
rules, and legal arguments in the reasoning of international judg-
ments, made by a municipal court confronted with the same legal
question.
A. Intervention
Intervention as a concept of international procedural law dates
back to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907.145 The ex-
ample of the Hague Conventions has been followed by judicial in-
struments of such universal character as the Statutes of the Per-
manent Court and the I.C.J.1 48 and by the 1928 Geneva General
Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.
147
Two forms of intervention exist, distinguished by the particu-
lar legal interest of the third party seeking to take part in the pro-
ceedings. The first presupposes an interest of a legal nature which
may be affected by the decision in the pending case.14  The second
requires disagreement as to the construction of a convention to
which States other than those participating in the case are par-
ties. 149 The consequences of the first form of intervention are not
explicitly defined. It may be concluded from the silence of the con-
vention or the Statute on this point that the intervening State is
bound to the same extent as the original parties to the dispute,
that is in the mutual relationship of all States participating in the
proceedings to each other, and with restriction to the actual case.
As regards the effect of the judgment on the municipal courts of
the intervening State, the same considerations are relevant as have
been set out in Section IV, supra, with reference to the national
courts of the State concerned as a party to a legal dispute.
The legal consequence of the second form of intervention is
that the construction of the treaty given by the judgment will be
equally binding on the intervening State.150 A State which inter-
venes because it is interested in a certain construction of the con-
vention in question and wants to avoid the risk of an unfavorable
construction without having its arguments heard. Having inter-
145. First Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 56; Second Hague Convention, supra
note 2, art. 84.
146. Statute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 62-63.
147. Sept. 26, 1928, arts. 36-37, 93 L.N.T.S. 344, 359.
148. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 62.
149. Id. art. 63.
150. Id. para. 2.
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vened, it is obliged to act in conformity with the construction de-
fined by the judgment in the operative clause or in the ratio
decidendi. It is doubtful whether res judicata goes as far as to pre-
vent the intervening State from disputing this construction before
the same court in a subsequent case involving the same legal prob-
lem. The municipal courts of the intervening States are not di-
rectly affected by the judgment, but must take this into account in
order to avoid their government being held responsible for non-
compliance with the convention. Here again, the same reflections
are to be made as in the parallel situation of national courts of the
original parties to the dispute.
If a multilateral treaty system expressly permits the right to
intervene in order to influence the construction of the treaty, it
follows that parties to the convention in question who do not avail
themselves of this right are not bound by the judgment given be-
tween other parties. The effect of res judicata extends only to in-
tervening States. Contracting States not intervening do, however,
incur the risk that the court will take the same line in the future.
If the State is not bound, its national organs, including the courts,
are a fortiori not concerned. The courts can, of course, use the in-
ternational judgment and its reasons as authority in their own rea-
soning in cases involving the same legal question.
The problem is more difficult if a multilateral treaty does not
provide for intervention by States seeking to influence the con-
struction thereof, although it 'is to be expected that a court will
apply the same construction in similar cases concerning other con-
tracting parties. The European Convention on Human Rights is
the most striking example of this problem; there is no article in the
Convention providing for intervention. As a practical matter, deci-
sions of the Court and, to a certain extent of the Commission, have
a prejudicial effect on other contracting parties.
The government of the United Kingdom felt this situation was
unfavorable to non-parties in certain cases. For example, the com-
patibility of internal statutes with provisions of the Convention
could be of interest not only for the defendant State, but also for
other member countries where legislation existed relating to the
point at issue. The United Kingdom, therefore, asked for an oppor-
tunity to present its legal views to the Court in a case involving a
conflict between private citizens and the Netherlands. After an ex-
change of letters between the government and the registry had
taken place, the Court took account, in its judgment, of an expos6
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by the British Government transmitted to the Court by the dele-
gates of the Commission which took part in all proceedings before
the Court. The Commission does not only submit the applicant's
case to the Court, but also represents the common interest of all
contracting States in a proper application and interpretation of the
convention.151 This quasi-intervention certainly does not have the
effect that the interpretation given to the article in question affects
the United Kingdom to a greater extent than the other parties to
the convention which were not parties to the case.
This case shows that contracting parties feel judgments which
formally bind only the defendant State have in fact a wider bear-
ing. Their desire to influence the construction of the Convention,
and to explain to the Court its consequences and indirect impact
on other countries, is perfectly legitimate. Although the Court nor-
mally makes inquiry into comparative law before it decides a ques-
tion which may have a prejudicial effect on countries other than
the defendant State, it may overlook problems resulting from legal
traditions or particular conditions of contracting parties not partic-
ipating in the dispute. Accordingly, the need to permit interven-
tion increases with the number of member States with different
legal systems and methods of legal thinking.
B. Implementation of Judgments by National Courts of States
Belonging to a Treaty System
One of the purposes of a multilateral treaty system is to pro-
vide for the uniform application and interpretation of all treaty
provisions by and within the member States. Treaties establishing
international organizations, in particular economic communities
and so-called "law-making" treaties, are clear examples of the need
for uniformity.
In the present context it is no longer necessary to discuss the
European Communities because they possess an autonomous legal
order of their own and a judiciary which possesses the monopoly of
binding decisions on the application and interpretation of Commu-
nity law.
On the other hand, the case law of the Strasbourg Court con-
fronts all 21 member States of the European Convention on
Human Rights with the problem of how to react to a decision in-
151. Winterwerp Case, [1979] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 426, (Judgment of
Oct. 24, 1979, ser. A, No. 33, para. 7 at 6). See also Drzemczewski, supra note 100, at 49.
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volving a question of interpretation which easily can be brought in
future Strasbourg proceedings against other defendant States. Ac-
cording to the terms of the Convention, the obligation to abide by
a decision is imposed only upon the party or the parties to the
dispute.' 52
Unlike the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals set up after the First
World War in Germany,5 3 the Strasbourg Court does not hold a
position equivalent to a municipal court of a member State. It can,
however, be maintained that the interpretation of a provision of a
convention by the Strasbourg Court is an authoritative definition
of that provision at least to the extent that the interpretation when
isolated from the facts of the actual application is not so closely
tied to the specific case that it has no importance in itself.
In the case of several Dutch soldiers against the Nether-
lands,15 4 the Strasbourg Court decided that although military disci-
plinary measures have no penal character, the guarantees provided
for by article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention for the "determina-
tion of any criminal charge" were applicable if the penalty imposed
by the judgment could be of the same severity as that normally
imposed only after criminal proceedings with full judicial guaran-
tees. Insofar as military legislation in some other countries did not
correspond to this interpretation, the question arose whether these
countries should change or amend their rules of military discipline.
The Swiss Federal Council, in a message to the Swiss Parliament,
took the view that the Swiss Penal Military Code should be
amended in view of this judgment.1 55
In another case relating to the period of the applicant's con-
tinued detention on remand, the Swiss Federal Court (Constitu-
tional Chamber) stated that notice must be given to the guarantees
conferred by the Convention which were relied on by the appli-
cant, and in particular, to their interpretation by the decisions of
the tribunal set up by the Convention. In this connection, the
Swiss Federal Court quoted the Wemhoff and Neumeister judg-
ments of the Strasbourg Court, relating to Germany and Austria
152. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 9, art. 53.
153. Judgment of June 15, 1923 (German Supreme Court) A II 1 FoNTEs JUIS GEN-
TIUM 258 (1931).
154. Case of Engel [1976] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 490, (Judgment of June 8,
1976, ser. A, No. 22, at 3).
155. See Malinverni and Wildhaber, La pratique suisse relative & la Convention








The judgment in the Engel case was also taken into account
by the Constitutional Court of Austria. The Court held "the conse-
quences in domestic law of this judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights need not, however, be examined in the instant case
since the judgment appealed against does not impose a sentence of
imprisonment.' 157 In a case concerning the guarantee of article 7 of
the Convention (non-retroactivity of Penal Laws) the same court
said that it "adopts" the opinion of the European Commission of
Human Rights in the matter.
5 8
Although the English courts must not apply the European
Convention on Human Rights and, a fortiori, cannot make a judg-
ment of the Strasbourg Court the basis of their decision, the dicta
of Strasbourg may be relevant for the construction of English law
in order to avoid discrepancies between an English judgment and
an international obligation of the Crown. In Attorney General v.
British Broadcasting Corporation, this consideration was called "a
question of legal policy.'
5 9
From these and other cases, it may be concluded that munici-
pal courts of other States which are parties to the Convention are
not bound by the interpretation given by the Strasbourg Court.
They normally adopt the interpretation of the Court as the official
and authoritative meaning of the provision in question. The legal
156. Decision of Nov. 3, 1976, [1977] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 801-03. The
guarantees in question of the Convention were articles 5 para. 3, and 6 para. 1.
157. Decision of Oct. 15, 1976, [1977] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 686-89.
158. Id. at 674-75.
159. [1980] 3 All ER 161. As Lord Scarman put it:
Of course, neither the convention nor the European Court's decision in Sunday
Times v. United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245 is part of our law. This House's
decision, even though the European court has held the rule it declares to be an
infringement of the convention, is the law. Our courts must continue to look not
to the European court's decision reported as Sunday Times v. United Kingdom
but to the House of Lords decision reported in Attorney General v. Times News-
papers Ltd. [1973] 3 All ER 54, [1974] A.C. 273 for the rule of English law. Yet
there is a presumption, albeit rebuttable, that our municipal law will be consistent
with our international obligations .... I do not doubt that, in considering how far
we should extend the application of contempt of court, we must bear in mind the
impact of whatever decision we may be minded to make on the international obli-
gations assumed by the United Kingdom under the European convention. If the
issue should ultimately be, as I think in this case it is, a question of legal policy,
we must have regard to the country's international obligation to observe the Euro-
pean convention as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.
Id. at 177-78.
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formulation to be given to this fact does not matter. Of significance
is the intention to contribute to the uniform application of the
rights guaranteed by the Convention in all member countries. The
rationale underlying the practice may also be that there is a risk of
losing future cases of the same kind if the government were to find
itself in the position of the defendant State. Another viewpoint
may be that all member States which made special declarations
recognizing as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court and the
right of individual petition to the Commission 6 0 are obliged to
consider the decisions of these organs as having persuasive author-
ity. The influence of Strasbourg case law will be greater as more
consistent jurisprudence is developed.61
C. National Court Citation of International Judgments
National bodies, including courts, often refer to international
decisions and their reasoning. This reference is the most important
manner by which the international judicature exercises its influ-
ence. In any given case, however, it is difficult to determine on
what basis the international judgment forms part of the reasoning
of the national court. Occasionally, the international court's argu-
ment is used in support of the municipal court's own reasoning.
Sometimes the international court is quoted along with other au-
thorities, e.g., legal writings and national judgments, in order to
show that a rule is generally recognized internationally, or that a
new rule is developing and can already be applied without violat-
ing international law.
The terms "source" and "evidence" of law have, in certain as-
pects, different meanings, but, as far as reference to international
judgments in national decisions is concerned, no sharp distinction
can be made between them since the intention of the judge to give
one a different degree of weight than the other is not normally in-
dicated. This author, therefore, shares the view of H. Lauterpacht
that the distinction between the evidence and the source of many
rules is more speculative and less rigid than is commonly sup-
posed.'62 All that can be said is that "evidence" of a rule is a more
appropriate definition of the importance which references of this
160. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 9, arts. 25, 46.
161. Drzemczewski, supra note 100, at 47.




kind have in the context of the national court's decision. The inter-
national judicature, taken as a whole, is certainly a source which
contributes to the development of law. If it is relied upon in a na-
tional judicial decision, the national court takes it as "evidence" of
the existence of the rule which it is going to apply.
Out of innumerable examples the following may be selected:
The case decided by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia concern-
ing, inter alia, the status of the so-called Spanish Bay on the coast
of Cape Breton, the decision in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries
Arbitration of 1909,163 and the judgment of the International Court
bf Justice in the Norwegian Fisheries case of 1951,8 have been
quoted, by several judges, on an equal footing with national deci-
sions and legal writings. 6 5
In its Judgment of July 22, 1952, the District Court of Tokyo
has referred to the interpretation given by the I.C.J. regarding the
concession agreement entered into between the Persian Govern-
ment and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The Higher Court of
Tokyo took the same line without mentioning the I.C.J.
judgment.
1 61
The Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of
Germany which is authorized, according to the Basic Law, to de-
fine general principles and rules of international law with binding
force within the German legal order, usually carries out thorough
research into international and national judgments relating to the
rule in question. For instance, the Court examines the extent of
immunity to be accorded to foreign governments in national legal
proceedings. References to international and national judgments,
as well as to legal writings of well known authors, are amply
quoted in the motivation of the operative clause. The operative
clause itself serves as a precise definition of the international rule
in the form which the court has determined such rules should be
expressed. 1
7
Rules of general international law are not static but may
change entirely or in part. This may be demonstrated by changes
in some very important rules; examples include the breadth of the
163. 11 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173 (1910).
164. [1951] I.C.J. 116.
165. Cape Breton Case (1963), 9 Commonw. L. Cases 221-86 (1978).
166. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 20 I.L.R. 305, 308-12
(Dist. and High Courts, Japan, 1953).
167. See, e.g., the judgment concerning the distinction between acta jure imperii and
acta jure gestionis, in the Judgment of Dec. 13, 1977, 46 BVerfGE 342, 361.
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territorial sea, the status of the continental shelf, the developing
maritime economic zone, the extent of the protection due to the
property of foreign nationals and companies, and the extent of sov-
ereign immunity before foreign courts. Rules may also develop
their bearing through the interpretation given by international
courts, especially by the I.C.J.
In countries whose courts do not adhere to stare decisis and in
which general international law is applied as part of the law of the
land, no difficulty arises with regard to the implementation of rules
of general international law as they develop through an evolutive
or dynamic interpretation of an international court. In contrast, in
countries where the courts are bound by precedent, the question
may arise whether they are able to follow changes in the law or
whether they must apply rules of international law according to
the established definition.168 The answer given by English courts
appears to be that the stare decisis rule cannot apply to the defini-
tion of a rule of general international law given in an earlier judg-
ment if the rule or interpretation has changed before the question
is re-examined for decision. 169 The latter solution is a logical conse-
quence of the rationale underlying the principle that the State in-
tegrates into international society through application of the com-
mon law of that society as precedent in its national legal order.
168. See Sawer, Australian Constitutional Law in Relation to International Relations
and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 35, 48-52 (1975).
169. Report on Decisions of British Courts during 1976-1977, (quoting Lord Denning in
2 U.I.R., 365 (1977)), 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 357-59 (1978). See also Trendtex Trading Corp.
v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 All E.R. 881; Drzemczewski, Judicial Reaffirmation of
the Doctrine of Adoption, 42 MoD. L. REv. 212 (1979); Drzemczewski, British Courts and
the European Human Rights Convention, 1979 TOPIcAL LAW 40. The Trendtex judgment
related to the changed conceptions of sovereign immunity.
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